I thought that cybernetics was trying to bring into view a crucial point in logical theory -- a point that is traditionally avoided by logic; one which Russell tried to eliminate by bringing in the theory of types. I thought of the theory of types as a miserable excuse for someone who doesn't want to take on the responsibility of saying "I'm saying that," because you are not supposed to say "I" with the theory of types. While working on these prefaces I got the feeling that some of the essential force of Wiener's arguments were somewhat diluted. And my hunch is that it was perhaps because of this perception, because of this dilution of the notion of cybernetics that artificial intelligence was separating itself from a cybernetics which had become nothing but control theory applied to living organisms. Cybernetics, for me, is the point where you can overcome Russell's theory of types by taking a proper approach to the notions of paradox, self-reference, etc., something that transfers the whole notion of ontology -- how things are -- to an ontogenesis -- how things become. (hvF)

talk with r.w. lawler and oliver g. selfridge.

" ...von Foerster said it very well, "The hard sciences appear hard because they tackle soft problems. The soft sciences face the harder problems."

another educational paper: "why today's computer don't learn the way people do" by william j. clancey what do you learn when you learn that you learn that's how the title of the symposium sounded to me when i was reading it first. but, claro, you should read here: what can we learn about learning by teaching machines to learn. almost a match, just a slide difference.

regarding to nytimes brian kernighan is now teaching over there.